The United States, which had ratified the original Kyoto agreement, withdrew from the protocol in 2001. The United States considered the agreement to be unfair because it called on industrialized countries to limit emissions reductions, and felt that it would hurt the U.S. economy. 1997 – In December, the parties conclude the Kyoto Protocol in Kyoto, Japan, by approving the broad outlines of the emissions targets. Government authorities may enter into agreements with one or more private parties. Most of these agreements are not legally binding. Some of them exist between the government and a number of companies, but in other cases, industry associations represent companies. While the agreements deal with general issues such as emissions reporting or energy efficiency, they may also be more specific, such as emissions target agreements. Emission limits do not include emissions from international aviation and shipping.  Although Belarus and Turkey are included in Schedule I of the agreement, they do not have emission targets since they were not parties to Schedule I at the time of the adoption of the protocol.
 Kazakhstan has no objective, but has stated that it wishes to become a contracting party to Schedule I of the Convention.  Some governments still doubt that voluntary agreements are really a satisfactory substitute for efficiency standards. They argue that the main reasons for the industry`s adherence to these agreements are to avoid the introduction of taxes on CO2 or energy and other financial instruments. It appears that the extent of mitigation of voluntary agreements is related to the likelihood of regulatory action in the absence of agreements. Although voluntary agreements are a relatively new political instrument, they are gaining popularity. The number of voluntary agreements already in place in Europe suggests that this instrument is administratively and politically feasible. Most industries seem to prefer voluntary agreements over other policy instruments. Environmental organizations also encourage enforcement. The United States and China, two of the world`s largest emitters, have produced enough greenhouse gases to mitigate the progress of nations that have achieved their goals.
In fact, global emissions increased by about 40% between 1990 and 2009. The economic basis for this flexibility lies in the fact that the marginal cost of reducing (or reducing) emissions varies from country to country. 660 “marginal costs” are the costs associated with eviscerating the last tonne of CO2-eq for part of Schedule I/non-Annex I. At the time of the initial Kyoto targets, studies suggested that flexibility mechanisms could reduce the total (total) cost of achieving the targets.  Studies have also shown that national losses in Schedule I of gross domestic product (GDP) could be reduced by the use of flexibility mechanisms.  The protocol was adopted at the third conference of the parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change in December 1997 and came into force on 16 February 2005. The main difference between the Kyoto Protocol and the agreement is that while the agreement has encouraged industrialized countries to stabilize emissions, the protocol sets binding targets. 1995 – The parties to the UNFCCC meet in Berlin (1st UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) to outline specific emission targets. However, the Kyoto Protcol targets are being challenged by climate change deities, who condemn strong scientific evidence of the human impact on climate change. An eminent scholar believes that these climate change deniers are “good” in violation of Roussau`s idea of the social contract, which is an implicit agreement between members of a society to coordinate efforts in the name of general social utility.
The movement to reject climate change is hampering efforts to reach an agreement on climate change as a global collective society.  The pre-Kyoto greenhouse gas emission targets were very different among the parties involved.